

APPLES AND ORANGES: A COMPARISON OF OPERATIONAL-LEVEL  
PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE OF CANADA,  
UNITED STATES, AND UNITED KINGDOM

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## ABSTRACT

APPLES AND ORANGES: A COMPARISON OF OPERATIONAL LEVEL PEACE OPERATIONS DOCTRINE OF CANADA, UNITED STATES, AND UNITED KINGDOM, by Lieutenant Colonel Colin G Magee, pages.

Changes in the operating environment have resulted in a fundamental change to the shape and nature of peace operations (PO). The result is that PO have become closer in nature to intervention operations, with a focus on peace enforcement operations, rather than the traditional peacekeeping operations upon which most nations developed their PO doctrine. This has resulted in changes to PO doctrine by Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Given that doctrine establishes the conceptual framework for how militaries conduct operations; a common doctrine is desired to ensure interoperability among allies and coalition members. Conversely, differences in doctrine can result in differing attitudes, approaches, and foci when the doctrine is operationalized for a particular mission. Thus, the intent of this paper is to determine if and where Canadian, American, and British operational-level PO doctrines diverge and converge.

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## ACRONYMS

CPKO	Complex Peacekeeping Operations
IFOR	Implementation Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PE	Peace Enforcement
PEO	Peace Enforcement Operations
PK	Peacekeeping
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PKF	Peacekeeping Forces
PO	Peace Operations
PSO	Peace Support Operations
ROE	Rules of Engagement
SFOR	Stabilization Force
TPKO	Traditional Peacekeeping Operations
UN	United Nations
UNITAF	United Task Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Military doctrine is military, and particularly tactical philosophy; doctrine creates certainty, which is the soul of every action

General A.A. Svechin. “The Foundation of Military Doctrine,” 1920

Since the end of the Cold War the nature of peace operations (PO) has changed. Traditional peacekeeping (PK) missions, based on lightly armed peacekeeping forces (PKF) or unarmed military observers deployed in the aftermath of an interstate conflict with a high level of consent from the state players, transformed into intervention operations conducted in volatile, intrastate conflicts in which consent was uncertain or lacking. Missions in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda demonstrated that these intrastate conflicts were generally beyond the competence of traditional peacekeepers and existing PK doctrine,<sup>1</sup> highlighting a need for new doctrine to guide and shape military operations.

In particular, the “failure” in Somalia had a dramatic impact on both United States (US) and Canadian militaries, forcing the development of new doctrine. The result was the US Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*, issued in 1999, and the Canadian *Peace Support Operations Doctrine*, issued in 2003. During the same period UK developed doctrine specifically for complexities of United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). Titled *Wider Peacekeeping*, this document was later refined and issued as Joint Warfare Publication (JEP) 3-50, *Peace Support Operations*.

In 1998 Robert Cassidy noted that the changing nature of PO, primarily the expansion into armed humanitarian operations, “lacked an overarching strategy or guidance”<sup>2</sup> which would allow commanders and planners to deal with this new environment. As these types of operations increased in the 1990s, national and regional organizations developed doctrine to meet the new challenges. However, in his examination of emerging doctrine, Cassidy noted differences and gaps not only among extant doctrine but also among the new draft doctrines. He pointed out that the lack of a common doctrine among traditional allies could have a negative impact on the conduct of multinational operations. Since Cassidy’s initial study, Canada, the United States, and UK have changed their operational-level doctrine for PO.

This thesis will update Cassidy’s work by examining how the operational-level military doctrines of the US, UK, and Canada define PO and what major principles underpin the doctrine for conducting PO. In doing so this thesis will identify where the national doctrines diverge and converge in their conceptual approaches to PO.

### Research Question

Are there areas of divergence in the new operational-level doctrine of Canada, the US, and the UK for PO that would cause interoperability issues? The following subordinate research questions support the primary questions:

1. How do the operational-level military doctrines of the US, UK, and Canada define PO?
2. What major principles underpin the doctrine for conducting PO?
3. Are there differences in the various doctrines?
4. What, if any, impact does any differences have on interoperability?

### Significance of Study

PO form a significant block of what is described as military operations other than war (MOOTW). In fact, for many professional armies that exist in relatively stable and economically prosperous regions, the study of and training for PO form a major component of their doctrine. Contemporary military operations, often referred to as Phase Four, post conflict, or stability and reconstruction operations, are seeing a blurring of PO and post conflict operations; in fact, much of the doctrinal underpinnings of these two types of operations are similar. Military planners are well aware of the importance of joint and multinational operational planning, which forms the backbone of sound PO; thus the study of operational level is critical.<sup>3</sup>

Changes in the operating environment have resulted in a fundamental change to the shape and nature of PO. The result is that PO have morphed towards broader and more complex intervention operations, with a focus on peace enforcement operations (PEO) rather than the traditional peacekeeping operations (PKO) upon which most nations developed their PO doctrine. This has resulted in changes to PO doctrine by Canada, the US, and the UK.

Given that doctrine establishes the conceptual framework for how militaries conduct operations; a common doctrine is desired to ensure interoperability among allies and coalition members. Conversely, differences in doctrine can result in differing attitudes, approaches, and foci when the doctrine is operationalized for a particular mission. Thus, the intent is to determine if and where Canadian, American, and British operational-level PO doctrines diverge to a point where the differences could cause interoperability issues.

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<sup>1</sup>Lt Col Wilkinson, “Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: The Development of a Common Military Doctrine for Peace Support Operations,” RMC WS 508, Graduate Course References, 4; and the findings from the Canadian Somalia Commission; available from <http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/somaliae.htm>; Internet.

<sup>2</sup>Robert Cassidy, “Armed Humanitarian Operations: The Development of National Military Doctrine in Britain, Canada, France and the United States, 1991-1997,” International Studies Association, 18-21 March 1998, in RMC WS 508 Course References, 2.

<sup>3</sup>Operational-level doctrine is by design joint.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Literature Review

Literature on the subject of PO is extensive. However, most of the literature focuses on challenges and issues of PO as a result of a number of perceived failures in the 1990s. Notwithstanding the volume of material, the depth of study is such that the literature can be divided into three main categories. First is the doctrine itself. Due to the scope of the thesis, the doctrine examined was restricted to that of the US, UK, and Canada. The second category is that material that actually discusses and compares PO doctrine. Last is material of a general nature that discusses PO, most of which is historically focused.

The UN has not promulgated doctrine for PO, and generic literature on the topic is plagued by imprecise definitions. Even the most essential of terms, such as consent, impartiality, and neutrality, which according Bruce Pirnie differentiate between PO and other types of military operations,<sup>1</sup> are applied inconsistently or vaguely defined. Therefore, it is essential that a solid understanding of how the particular author is applying the selected terms is essential. In order to ensure a common framework, the definitions of commonly used terms that widely vary from those found in one of the national doctrines have been replaced with the doctrinally accepted term.

## Doctrine

While the primary review of PO doctrine was focused on the operational level, in the case of the US Army doctrine was also examined in order to expand on a general theme or idea.

Canadian doctrine is found in B-GL-300-001, *Peace Support Operations*. Published in 2002, it is the most recently published doctrine of the three nations examined. The 2002 version is a result of the changing operational environment in which the Canadian Forces found themselves in the early to mid-nineties and a direct result of the incidents surrounding the Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia as part of the US-lead Unified Task Force (UNITAF) mission. The Canadian doctrine introduces the idea of three types of PO--traditional peacekeeping operations (TPKO), complex peacekeeping operations (CPKO), and peace enforcement operations.

US PO doctrine is found in JP 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peace Operations*. Issued in 1999, the American doctrine was completed following the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) and subsequent -United Nations Operation Somalia (UNOSOM) missions and as such is the oldest of the three nations studied. US doctrine tends to reflect the concerns raised by Western militaries as they attempted to resolve the issues all nations faced in operating in the post-Cold War environment. In particular, the US doctrine attempts to deal with the grey zone between Chapter VI and Chapter VII operations.

British doctrine is articulated in JWP 3-50, *Peace Support Operations*. Published in 2000, it is in essence the formalization of doctrine used in the various missions in the former Yugoslavia. Building upon earlier doctrine, initial drafts of JWP 3-50, entitled



*Wider Peace Keeping*, was developed in response to an urgent operational requirement to meet the doctrinal needs of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPRFOR) mission in the former Yugoslavia. This manual was designed specifically to offer guidance to armed forces that were operating in Bosnia and that were attempting to keep the peace in the midst of a civil war when there was no peace to keep. In acknowledgment that it was overly Bosnia-specific, and that doctrinal developments in Peace Support Operations (PSO) were likely to be dynamic, Army Field Manual *Wider Peacekeeping*”(WPK) was issued as an interim edition only. The manual also acknowledged that it makes little sense to produce a purely national doctrine for what are self-evidently multinational operations which involve a wider group of civilian agencies, as well as military forces. In many ways, therefore, the UK’s “WPK” set the scene for subsequent doctrinal developments.

### Comparison of Peacekeeping Operations Doctrine

Literature that actually compares the national doctrine is scarce. The main references and the inspiration for this work are the two works by Robert Cassidy. His article found in the course material of the Canadian Royal Military College’s graduate course Peace Operations, titled “Armed Humanitarian Operations: The Development of National Military Doctrines in Britain, Canada, France, and the US, 1991-1997,” provides an initial examination of the three countries under investigation. This article, based on Cassidy’s doctoral work, provides a number of interesting insights that highlight a number of interoperability issues. While this work provides a conceptual framework, the doctrines Cassidy examines are older versions and as such are not directly applicable today. His second work *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War* is a result of his doctoral work and builds on

changes in the doctrine. Although he uses some of the current doctrine, he neither includes Canada in this work nor examines the differences in doctrine from an interoperability perspective. His examination is one of military culture, with the focus on the use of force and how this element of military culture influenced the development of post-Cold War PO doctrine and the actual conduct of operations. Additionally, Cassidy's work focuses on army rather than joint or operational-level doctrine.

Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson's *Sharpening the Weapons of Peace: The Development of a Common Military Doctrine for Peace Support Operations* suggests that a new doctrine of impartial peace enforcement (PE) has been designed around an international consensus to ensure that military forces do not become party to a conflict but use a combination of coercion and inducement to create the conditions in which other diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can build peace. His paper outlines the responsibility of the head of mission (European Union High Representative or UN Special Representative) to develop and coordinate the mission plan, although the military force commander will make a significant contribution. This approach to PO reflects the broader political, diplomatic, and humanitarian context of PO, which is beyond the direct scope of the study but is useful in framing the context within which the military will operate.

Jakkie Potieter's *Evolution of a National Doctrine for Peace Support Operations* takes a similar approach to that of Cassidy in comparing the national doctrines of the US, UK, and France. In a similar manner to Cassidy, Potieter focuses on the definition of PO and the major principles of consent, legitimacy, use of force, and impartiality. The use of

French doctrine provides an interesting perspective on intervention operations not seen in English-speaking doctrines.

### General Discussion of Peace Operations

Literature on the evolution of PO and most recently the future of PO is plentiful. The difficulty with this subset of literature is that it either examines PO from an historical view, generally in case study format with little analysis of the doctrine used, or deals with the future of PO; much of it is subjective in nature. Notwithstanding these issues, most of the literature researched does provide a number of common themes that can be used for examining if the current doctrine meets the needs of the contemporary and future operating environment.

Most of the literature in this category was written in the mid- to late-1990s, when the debate on the appropriate training and preparation for PO in the post-Cold-War period was at its height. The debate centers on a number of themes: first is the discussion on the extent to which traditional concepts of peacekeeping have been replaced by newer concepts of peace enforcement and peace building. Second is the acknowledgment of the increase in civilian participation in PO, making contemporary PO more complex. Third is the shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts, making the operating environment more volatile and violent. Last is the acknowledgment that PO are increasing, multidimensional, and complex. Much of the literature discusses the age-old question of whether soldiers make the best peacekeepers or are simply the only people that can do the job.

Edward Moxon-Brown's *A Future for Peacekeeping?* presents a series of papers that not only effectively discuss the issue of peacekeeping versus peace enforcement, but

also links this shift to the British concept of wider peacekeeping. In a number of articles the distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement is based upon the level of conflict. Using Fisher's "contingency model" the paper suggest a more flexible role to intervention in which soldiers continue to have a role, but the concept of intervention is expanded to include civilian and police units, election supervisors, and health workers.

Majorie Browne's *United Nations Peacekeeping: Historical Overview and Current Issues* and Gootab Elanders' *Challenges of Peace Operations: Into the 21st Century; Concluding Report 1997-2002* provides insights into current and future PO. Like much of the literature in this category, these references emphasize the interagency requirements and the shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts, which bring with them a higher level of low-level violence. In response to the increase in violence combined with reduced consent of the factions, Douglas Fraser and James Kiras' *Peacekeeping with Muscle: The Use of Force in International Conflict Resolution* argues for "armed humanitarian intervention," a term used by much of the literature to address the gap between PKO and PEO. Vladimir Shustov's *Can the UN Fight a War?* focuses on the recommendations contained in the Brahimi report and the Russian response to them. Expanding on Fraser's work, the sections include: "The Need for Change," "Preventive Diplomacy," "Peace Maintenance Doctrine and Strategy," "Peace-Building," "Ensuring Effective Peacekeeping Operations," and "Russia's position." The paper gives Russia's position on a number of issues, including its highly critical assessment of how the Kosovo mission was, and still is, handled.

John Hillen's *Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations*, is perhaps one of the most-referenced material that has been found. Hillen discusses the operational

environment and examines a wide range of missions that span the entire history of PO.

This reference is extremely useful for providing an overview of PO in particular in comparing academic criteria with case studies.

In all, this subset of literature provides an interesting look back into the debates of the 1990s. Such a perspective is useful as it provides not only a framework for contemporary PO, but more importantly also provides a checklist of elements needing consideration as the three militaries in question reviewed and rewrote their PO doctrines. From a research perspective, it is interesting to compare the suggestions given in this category of literature with the changes made in the PO doctrine. However, in doing so it must be cautioned that the recommendations in most of the literature fall into the strategic and political levels of PO and, as a result, do little to inform the operational- and tactical-level doctrine writers.

### Research Methodology

In order to address the primary and secondary questions it is first necessary to examine how each nation uses doctrine. The need to qualify how the three militaries see the role of doctrine is essential to ensure that doctrine plays a similar role in informing and influencing the conduct of operations. Once a common perspective on the use and importance of doctrine is determined, resulting in a common understanding of the role of doctrine being developed, it is necessary to develop an understanding of how each nation studied defines PO. This stage is critical as it establishes the framework within which each of the national approaches to PO will be compared and contrasted. On completion of establishing a common framework, an examination of extant operational-level doctrine will be conducted to determine major themes, principles, or tenets and how they relate to

the planning and conduct of PO. A comparison of each nation's tenets of PO will demonstrate areas of congruence, as well as areas of divergence. Given that this study is to determine if there are areas that negatively affect interoperability, the focus will shift onto any areas of divergence.

By adopting the above methodology, the research should provide the answers to both the primary and subordinate research questions of the thesis. Recommendations and conclusions of the research will be found in the final chapter of the study

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<sup>1</sup>Bruce R. Pirnie and Willaim E. Simons, *Soldiers for Peace* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), 38-40.

## CHAPTER 3

### ANALYSIS

#### Peace Operations 101

The United Nations (UN) Charter states that the role of the UN is “To maintain international peace and security, and to that end take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace.”<sup>1</sup> This concept is translated into concrete measures through the United Nations Security Council. Chapters VI and VII of the Charter provide the mechanisms for the Security Council to act. Chapter VI (peaceful settlement) provides that international disputes “likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” can be brought to the attention of the Security Council. Chapter VI lists the traditional techniques of diplomacy, including negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies, and other peaceful means available to the Security Council and the warring factions to resolve the conflict. Under Chapter VI the Security Council is to call on the parties to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The actions of the Security Council, and the UN as a whole, are limited to making recommendations and assisting the parties involved. Chapter VI requires that the parties to the dispute achieve a settlement on a voluntary basis rather than through the use of force or coercion by the UN.

Conversely, Chapter VII concerns forceful ways of dealing with threats to peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression. Article 40 allows the Security Council to call on the parties involved in the conflict to comply with measures the Security Council deems necessary. Failure to comply allows the Council, under Article 42, to take “such action by air, sea and land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international

peace and security.”<sup>2</sup> In this type of operation the use of force is expected to coerce the factions into complying with their earlier agreements or with a resolution of the Security Council. Failing that, Chapter VII allows the UN to take appropriate military action to enforce peace and security. Chapter VII is normally invoked when one or more of the factions withdraw consent and the Security Council decides to enforce its will. Thus the use of Chapter VII depends on the five permanent members of the Security Council agreeing that enforcement must be compatible with their interests and the interests of the international community at large.<sup>3</sup>

Of note, the UN Charter does not specifically refer to PO, in particular PK and PE. Rather, the military aspects of these operations have evolved over time as a means to implement national and international goals. Even after fifty years, the UN has not developed PO doctrine; instead it relies on the principles and tenets of traditional PKO, which are generally reflected in the various mandates. The result has been the development of “nondoctrine.” Most of the literature on the subject divides PO into two categories that conveniently align themselves with either Chapter VI or VII of the UN Charter.

A PK, Chapter VI, operation is generally defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement powers, with the intent to assist the belligerents in restoring or maintaining peace and security in areas of conflict. From the belligerents’ perspective, these operations are voluntary and are based on their own consent and cooperation. That is, the peacekeeping force (PKF) is allowed in with the permission of the various factions, and, as such, Chapter VI missions generally involve a limited mandate restricting PKF to supervisory rather than enforcement roles. Of note,



traditional PKO do not keep the peace; they facilitate agreements, already made by the warring factions that may promote peace. This aspect can be seen in figure 1, where traditional peacekeeping relies on a high level of consent. As a result, the success of maintaining peace depends primarily on the various factions.




Figure 1. Comparison of Categories of Peace Operations  
Source: William Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1998), 8.

Chapter VII, PEO, allow for enforcement. A force acting under authority of Chapter VII is expected to be capable of restoring international peace and security by conducting combat operations if necessary. As can be seen in Figure 1, PEO do not rely on consent but rather on the ability to apply force to coerce the factions into complying

with the mandate. In the immediate development of doctrine after the Cold War, there was a general assumption that PE was synonymous with war, and therefore war-fighting doctrine was sufficient for its execution. For example, the 1991 Gulf War was widely described as a PEO. In 1993 in Somalia, when the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) decided to escalate and target President Aideed, the operation moved from one of PK to war-fighting--by-passing PE completely--and thereby made UNOSOM II a party to the conflict. The problem with this approach was that PE doctrine did not mean for the force to be considered a party to the conflict. In fact, from the UN and the troop contributing nations perspective, the force was not considered a party to the conflict but, like the PKF in PKO, it was seen as an impartial party dealing with all sides equally, with the use of force dependant upon the actions (noncompliance) of the individual factions. This experience demonstrated the need to define the grey area between PK and war so as to offer policy makers a wider range of more appropriate options. The new doctrine of impartial PE was designed to ensure that military forces do not become a party to a conflict but use a combination of coercion and inducement to create the conditions in which other diplomatic and humanitarian agencies can build peace. It is this area that adds a level of confusion in the various national doctrines, as the differences between shades of PEO are not clearly articulated.

However, since the 1990s PO have not been purely military. They have included political, economic, and humanitarian efforts. This expansion beyond the military has forced various PK and PE forces to conduct a wide range of missions, with a vast array of participating organizations and objectives. This new mission type is generally referred to as multidimensional operations. In addition to the increasing complexity of partners and

tasks, PO have shifted from interstate to intrastate conflict, with consent becoming uncertain or sporadic. As such, it becomes difficult to categorize these missions as either VI or VII. The gap between Chapters VI and VII can be best seen in the area of transition. Former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld defined these operations as Chapter “six and a half.” This hybrid mission is generally classified as complex PO. The difficulty with this new generation of PO was that because it did not neatly fit into either Chapter VI or Chapter VII, as did the doctrine and literature, nations lacked a conceptual construct to apply to these new missions, resulting in a doctrine gap. Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the different types of PO with the grey area defining the doctrinal gap.

A clear conceptual framework is needed to assist decision-makers in selecting an optimal type of operation. From a military perspective, such a framework allows for an informed and consistent advice to political leaders. Although it is difficult to define a common mission, the range of operations can be reduced to four basic types: traditional peacekeeping, multidimensional PO, peace enforcement, and complex PO.<sup>4</sup>

While some may argue the need for a coherent UN doctrine, the utility of such a doctrine is questionable, especially when the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali pointed out that, in terms of Chapter VII, “Neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose.”<sup>5</sup> Thus, while the UN is able to plan and direct PKO, other organizations are required to effectively plan and direct PEO. It is here that the divergence of national doctrines has impact.

## Doctrine

Operational doctrine establishes the framework within which military planners and commanders analyze, plan, and execute operations. This framework establishes a common understanding and action that informs the decision-making process. In part, doctrine establishes the preferences and predilections for how and when to employ force. For most militaries doctrine is an expression of a military's fundamental approach to conducting operations. The lack of precision in common literature, combined with the lack of an authoritative UN doctrine, makes PO more difficult to conduct successfully. It is this lack of precision that generates a widespread criticism that PO have become murky and improperly defined.

Since PO are highly political, they must make operational sense. That is, the operational-level commander must translate strategic direction into tactical actions. This need for an operational perspective requires a conceptual framework which can be used by the operational commander to determine what tasks he must perform, what authorization he has to employ force, and how much cooperation he should expect from the factions.<sup>6</sup> Doctrine provides such a conceptual framework.

A common doctrine among allies or coalition partners establishes a common baseline for the conduct of operations by allowing for interoperability of the mind. National doctrines that are consistent offer the first step to interoperability, while national doctrines that diverge can create interoperability issues, particularly in the area of politically sensitive PO.

The British define military doctrine as “a formal expression of military knowledge and thought, that the Army accepts as being relevant at a given time, which

covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success.”<sup>7</sup> The US defines doctrine as “fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”<sup>8</sup> Canada sees doctrine as “providing a common understanding of the nature of conflict as well as the planning and conduct of combat operations.”<sup>9</sup> It is important to note that operational-level doctrine has a somewhat different focus than that of tactical-level doctrine. Operational-level doctrine concerns itself with the principles that govern the conduct of campaigns and major operations and imparts understanding. At the tactical level, doctrine focuses more on instruction and training, ensuring that commanders have a common foundation on which to base plans for the execution of their mission. Thus, operational-level doctrine provides a conceptual framework or construct which guides thought and organizes how operations are planned, and in doing so provides the what to do, while tactical level doctrine provides the how to do it. For the purposes of this thesis doctrine is viewed as an authoritative expression of a military’s fundamental approach to conducting operations<sup>10</sup>. It is an expression of the fundamental principles according to which armed forces conduct operations. The operationalization of compatible and consistent national doctrines creates cohesion in the planning and conduct of multinational operations.<sup>11</sup>

### United States Doctrine

Seen as a component of MOOTW, the term “peace operations” is used in US doctrine when discussing the wide range of missions that encompass modern PK missions. It is defined as “a broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and

peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace.”<sup>12</sup> Within this construct of PO there are two sub-sets : PKO and PEO.

PKO are designed to “monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement . . . and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.”<sup>13</sup> The peacekeepers’ main function is seen as establishing a presence, which inhibits hostile actions by the disputing parties.<sup>14</sup> The US view of PKO maintains many of the tenets of traditional peacekeeping: high level of consent, impartiality of the peacekeeping force, and restrained use of force. In fact, the doctrine emphasizes that the PKF’s ability to execute its mandate is dependent on the consent of the belligerents. On the other hand, the Americans see PEO as “the application of military force or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.”<sup>15</sup>

In framing the PO concept and its two subsets, US doctrine qualifies PKO and PEO under the general construct of Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, respectively. In providing a conceptual framework, US doctrine emphasizes that there is a clear distinction between PKO and PEO, underlining the fact that although doctrinally both are subsets of PO they are not part of a continuum, but rather separate types of operations. It is the relationship of three factors: the level of consent of the factions, impartiality of the PKF and the use of force that is used to differentiate between PKO and PEO.<sup>16</sup> Given the importance of these three factors it is worthwhile examining them in some detail.

Of the three factors, it is the level of consent that is seen as key in deciding whether a mission is a PKO or PEO. Consent is seen as the measurable willingness of the

factions to accomplish the goals of the mission. Consent is demonstrated by the participation of the factions to implement the agreement, cooperation with the PKF, and compliance with the various elements of the agreement or mandate.

Impartiality is defined as treating all sides to the conflict in a fair and even-handed manner, “recognizing neither aggressor nor victim.”<sup>17</sup> In PKO, impartiality is demonstrated through investigations, reports, and the conduct of negotiations and mediation. In PEO, impartiality is normally associated with how and against whom force or the threat of force is applied. Though impartiality is considered important, particularly in how force is applied, an interesting point regarding impartiality is the fact that US doctrine states, “The central goal of PEO is the achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality.”<sup>18</sup> In short, while seen as critical for PKO, impartiality is viewed as desirable but not necessary and as such is not considered central to achieving success in PEO.<sup>19</sup> This does not mean that impartiality is abandoned; in fact, US doctrine recognizes that by establishing the conditions for peace in an impartial manner, the transition from conflict to peace can be easier, but the doctrine places impartiality as a less important factor. Such an approach to the use of impartiality in the US construct creates a grey area in which the identification of an enemy or aggressor and the subsequent application of force towards that faction is focused. This paradigm moves away from the idea that it is the conflict that is the enemy, towards the “higher end” of Chapter VII missions, in which an aggressor or enemy is identified and force is directed towards that faction. According to the doctrine it is the lack of an identified enemy that separates PEO from war fighting.

The level of consent has a direct impact on the use of force. By definition, as well as the inherent capability of the force, PKO are prohibited from using force to compel compliance and, as a general rule, rely on noncoercive measures, reserving the use of force for self-defense. The PKF relies on the consent of the parties to complete its mission. For PEO, the doctrine moves away from the tradition of minimum use of force to discuss the “use of appropriate force” and, if necessary, “overwhelming force.”<sup>20</sup> While restraint is discussed as a principle, it is found more in the description of restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) and not necessarily a mind-set for planners and commanders. As such, it establishes a more aggressive attitude towards PO.

Although the doctrine emphasizes that PKO and PEO are not part of a continuum, “a distinct demarcation separates these operations,”<sup>21</sup> and transition PK to PE and PE to PK is discussed.<sup>22</sup> Notwithstanding the guidance that “PK forces should not transition to PEO or vice versa,”<sup>23</sup> the doctrine warns that the “dynamic environment in which these operations take place” can cause grey areas. As such, transition may be unavoidable and, therefore, should be planned for.<sup>24</sup> This apparent disconnect in doctrine would appear to indicate that, while the prudent course of action is to plan for and employ a PE force, if there is uncertainty, political or diplomatic requirements may, for a number of reasons, force the deployment of a PK force. Therefore, as part of the planning process the commander should be prepared for augmentation or withdrawal from the area of operations. This acknowledgement of the potential to transition from PKO to PEO reinforces the notion of Chapter-VI-type missions as a potential doctrinal construct.

The transition from PEO to PKO is easier to articulate, as the aim of PEO is to reduce its operational profile to that of a PKO and subsequent transition to a PKF of some



type.<sup>25</sup> This perspective is important as it reinforces the idea that the military, by itself, cannot provide the solution, that is, it cannot impose an effective peace by force without becoming a party to the conflict, but can help set the conditions for other elements.

In addition to PKO and PEO, US doctrine identifies a number of military operations that are conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish peace and order before, during, and after conflict. These other operations include preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. While US doctrine recognizes the broad range of military support to these wider peace operations, they are not considered PO, and not discussed within the context of PO doctrine.

### British Doctrine

British doctrine uses the term “peace support operations (PSO)” to cover all peace-related operations. This not only includes PK and PE, but also takes into account conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building, and humanitarian operations. Notwithstanding this broader definition, the PSO manual only addresses PK and PE operations, as the British view is that, regardless of what the operation is called, military activities will be conducted with either a PK or PE profile.<sup>26</sup> PSO are seen as multifunctional operations that, in addition to military forces, involve diplomatic and humanitarian agencies. Like American PO, British PSO are conducted to support long-term political settlements. Within this framework, British doctrine includes humanitarian goals as a major component of PSO. In framing PSO doctrine the British manual also aligns PK and PE with Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter. In doing so, the British doctrine recognizes the broad range of enforcement actions under Chapter VII operations and the possibility of confusion. The doctrine notes that the use of force under Chapter

VII has two elements--the first being “partial enforcement operations, such as the Korean and Gulf Wars, which are designed to change the correlation of local forces and impose a solution by force,”<sup>27</sup> and the second being impartial PE, such as the NATO lead Implementation Force (IFOR) and follow-on Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. British doctrine defines PE as “the use of impartial force to enforce a mandate without supporting or taking action against a particular party.”<sup>28</sup>

The principle of consent, often seen as the most fundamental principle of traditional peacekeeping, remains a cornerstone of UK PSO doctrine. Consent is seen as the cooperation, compliance, and acceptance of the process by the factions involved in the conflict. Though critical, it is not seen as a given, but as a variable in the current operational environment. UK doctrine acknowledges: “Consent to wider peacekeeping activities is likely to be anything but absolute. In theatre, depending on the volatility of the general environment, it is unlikely ever to be more than partial and could amount to nothing more than tolerance of presence. Consent is something that the peacekeeper can expect to have bits of, from certain people, in certain places, for certain things, for certain periods of time.”<sup>29</sup>

As mentioned earlier, it is the level of consent that delineates PKO from PEO. PKO are “carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties.”<sup>30</sup> PKO are not considered to be feasible without the consent of all the factions involved in the conflict. It is through the use of those techniques that promote consent and the active cooperation of all parties to the peace-building process that makes a PKO successful.<sup>31</sup> Thus force is used only for self-defense. In contrast, PEO activities are those carried out “to restore peace between belligerent parties who do not all consent to intervention.”<sup>32</sup>

The idea of impartiality in both PKO and PEO is fundamental to the British concept. As highlighted above, it is this element that distinguishes PEO with the wider, more warlike enforcement operations under Chapter VII. PEO are seen as coercive operations that are required when there is an absence of consent or if consent is uncertain. Although the force should have sufficient force to “overwhelm” any opposition, a key aspect of British doctrine is the use of restraint and the attempt to use other noncoercive techniques that are normally associated with PKO.

The British see PKO and PEO as being along a spectrum, with PKO at the low end and PEO at the higher end. Consent is used to separate PKO from PEO while impartiality is used to separate PEO from war fighting. In placing PKO and PEO along a spectrum, British doctrine allows, in fact it plans for, a transition between the two. However, given the force structure and combat capability inherent in PKO, it warns “a PK force should only make the transition to PE as the result of a deliberate policy decision and a change in mandate” noting “it will almost certainly require substantial force restructuring.”<sup>33</sup> Perhaps more useful is the concept that once compliance has been obtained the aim of the PE force should be to lower its operational profile to one more akin to PK.<sup>34</sup> Such a view of PKO and PEO provides a clear understanding of their place and relationship with each other, particularly as elements of power to achieve strategic goals. While the UK and US doctrines appear to say the same thing, the US doctrine, rather simply, attempts to provide a clear break between PKO and PEO that in the end complicates the concept.

## Canadian Doctrine

Canadian doctrine also uses the term “peace support operations” to define the range of PO its military may perform. Unlike other nations, Canada does not frame its doctrinal conceptual model by the chapter of the United Nations Charter. Rather, it groups PSO by the typical tasks that are performed during the mission. The result is that there “is a clear distinction between those things done in a traditional peacekeeping mission, like Cyprus, and a modern mission that tries to stem a complex emergency, like Sierra Leone.”<sup>35</sup> Instead of the terms PKO and PEO, Canadian doctrine uses the terms “traditional peacekeeping operations (TPKO)” and “complex peacekeeping operations (CPKO).” While the Canadian construct does not see TPKO and CPKO as part of a continuum, specific tasks carried out are.

In order to further clarify the distinction between PEO, in which there is no designated enemy, and enforcement operations, in which there is a designated enemy, Canadian doctrine reserves the term peace enforcement for “when the UN actually carries out a pure enforcement action, such as UNITAF.”<sup>36</sup> Like the British, Canadian PSO doctrine includes conflict prevention, peacemaking, traditional and complex peacekeeping, and peace building. Humanitarian operations are not considered PSO, but are defined as related operations that can be conducted concurrently, complementarily, or independently.<sup>37</sup>

TPKO are characterized by their impartial conduct, the high level of consent of the parties to the dispute, and the PKF’s authorization to use force only in self-defense. They are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement, so that diplomatic negotiations can seek a comprehensive political settlement. As with other PK

doctrine, it is the high level of consent of the parties that allows the PKF to be lightly armed and equipped. An interesting note is that the Canadian doctrine emphasizes that traditional missions are usually fielded to assist in the settlement of dispute between states. It also notes that the occupation and control of interstate borders requires fewer interactions between the PKF and civil agencies in theater. Canadian doctrine does not see the military mission in TPKO being as closely linked with the civil mission, as in complex peacekeeping.<sup>38</sup> This view is contrary to US and UK doctrines, which view all PSO missions as multidimensional in nature, and may result in Canadian PKF being unable or unprepared to work within an interagency environment.

CPKO are characterized by their impartial conduct, the low or uncertain level of consent of the parties to the dispute, and the PKF's broader authorization to use force. The Canadian concept sees CPKO as being initiated after a peace accord has been signed and the parties have consented to the operation. This aspect of the doctrine further delineates the difference between PSO and other forms of enforcement operations. That is, even under CPKO there is some type of accord, agreement, or mandate. Notwithstanding the fact that there may be a "paper agreement," the doctrine recognizes that the consent and compliance of the actors may be uneven and inconsistently observed throughout their chain of command. The PKF maintains its impartiality by applying the terms of the mandate equally to all parties. Unlike TPKO, CPKO are launched in failed states or where intrastate conflict has weakened central authority and caused a humanitarian emergency.

The aim of a CPKO is not to defeat or destroy an enemy, but rather to encourage, coerce, or compel the parties to the conflict to abide by a peace agreement or mandate.

Therefore, adequate military forces are required so that the mission has a credible and coercive combat capability. While the more robust use of force must be an option, the operation will still use the minimum force necessary to accomplish its objectives. Perhaps as a response to the mission in Somalia, Canadian doctrine attempts to keep PSO black and white--it is either a PK mission, traditional or complex, or it is an enforcement-war mission.<sup>39</sup> Thus, unlike the UK and the US, Canada has separated out enforcement action as “a related operation” rather than as a part of PO.

Canadian doctrine sees enforcement actions as those operations that are carried out under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.<sup>40</sup> They are combat operations allowing for the use of all appropriate means necessary to achieve the political goals of the United Nations. They can precede a PSO, run concurrently with it, or support the termination of one. An enforcement action may set the necessary conditions for the establishment of a PK mission. These operations are normally conducted by a coalition of willing states or a regional organization vice directly by the UN. The complete range of combat multipliers may not automatically be employed, but, like CPKO, enforcement actions can benefit from the factions being clearly aware of the intervening force’s capabilities, goals, and objectives. Thus, even in enforcement operations Canadian doctrine recognizes that the parties to the dispute play a key role in the escalation or de-escalation of the use of force.

Canadian doctrine recognizes consent, impartiality, and the minimum use of force as fundamental principles to guide military activities in PSO. In the application of these principles, it is the determination of the weight and the importance of each principle that changes, dependant on the specific operations. Consent of the parties is a major component of Canadian doctrine and is used to determine if a particular operation should

be conducted under the TPKO or CPKO framework. Impartiality is used as a fundamental operating principle to guide the PKF's conduct. Regardless of the situation, Canadian doctrine emphasizes that the PKF's conduct should always be impartial and even-handed. This is translated to the use of force. If force is used against a particular party, it should only be because of what that party is doing (or not doing) in relation to the mandate, rather than because of who that particular party is. The final element is the concept of the minimum use of force. Regardless of the subset of PSO under which a force is operating, "force should always be used with restraint; only the minimum necessary to accomplish a specific task should be employed."<sup>41</sup>

### Comparison of National Doctrines

In comparing and contrasting national doctrines, a number of factors can be used to identify areas of divergence that could lead to interoperability problems during the execution of PO. In reviewing the main aspects of the doctrines, four elements for comparison become evident:

1. The use of PO as part of a larger conceptual framework
2. The definition of PKO
3. The definition of PEO
4. The views on the three consistent elements of consent, impartiality, and use of force

The most obvious difference is in the term used by each nation. While Canada and UK both use the term "peace support operations," the US uses the term "peace operations," retaining the use of support for other uses, such as support to host nations and humanitarian support operations. US doctrine acknowledges this difference but states

the terminology difference is minor and of no significance.<sup>42</sup> In practical terms the name given to these operations is consistent enough not to be an issue. It is the subordinate concepts within this framework and how they are articulated that are the areas of potential conflict.

Mark Malan points out “there is little room for debate or speculation on extant peacekeeping doctrine, as it has evolved from 51 years of UN experience. The principles of peacekeeping are largely uncontested across existing global divides.”<sup>43</sup> It is when PEO are discussed that issues develop. The review of the national doctrines supports Malan’s comment. For the most part, all the national doctrines are in agreement about what constitutes peacekeeping, with the consent of the parties paramount to success of PKO. In fact, a common basis for PKO is the acknowledgement that it is the “assured” level of consent that determines if an operation should be undertaken as a PKO or a PEO. Crossing the “consent divide” from PKO to PEO is a policy-level decision that fundamentally changes the nature of the operation. Thus, a common theme among the national doctrines is that the difference between PKO and PEO is not the level of violence, but rather the level of consent.

Yet, there is a difference between US and UK-Canadian PK doctrines in the area of self-defense. The notion of self-defense can be interpreted in a number of ways. UK and Canadian doctrine both state that self-defense can range from the defense of the PKF to other mission elements and even to civilians. It is the mandate as supported by the ROE that determines the full extent of self-defense. Within this construct, while UK and Canadian doctrines reserve the use of force for self-defense, US doctrine allows for the use of force not only in self-defense, but also in defense of the mission, even within



PKO.<sup>44</sup> This divergence in conceptual framework makes the US doctrine potentially more aggressive in execution. Such an outlook can have an impact on force structure, force posture, assigned tasks, and ROE.

Additionally, the execution of tactical-level tasks assigned under this construct may be different from those that would be executed under the UK or Canadian constructs. Overall, the use of force to compel or coerce compliance among the warring factions is a common element throughout US PO doctrine, but is less evident in British and Canadian doctrines. At first, this divergence appears to lower the importance US doctrine places on consent, thereby blurring the line between PKO and PEO. However, a detailed review of the US PKO doctrine reveals this is not the case; in fact, the US preoccupation in delineating between PKO and PEO is a recurring theme throughout. The difficulty with the US doctrine is that the conceptual construct is not fully supported by the methods outlined to operationalize the doctrine, thereby leaving a grey area and thus room for Possible confusion.

In situations where consent is lacking or uncertain, the US and UK use the term PE while Canada has chosen to use the term CPKO. The intent in all three doctrines is to distinguish PEO from war. This is accomplished by stressing that the enemy is the conflict and not a specified faction. This leads to the construct, reflected in all three national doctrines, that the distinction between PE and war fighting is that war fighting is seen as being based on the defeat of a designated enemy, whereas PE is based on enforcing a particular mandate. It is this difference in end state--the creation of conditions that allow civilian agencies to address the causes of the conflict and, therefore, create a

self-sustaining peace--that not only helps differentiate PEO-CPKO from war, but also is the main reason for the new doctrine.

While the use of force can be a major component in PEO, it is the judicious and impartial use of force that is compatible with the longer-term requirements of peace building that influences the conduct of operations. All three national doctrines recognize this as a basic fundamental; however, as described below, it is the difference in application of these principles that is cause for concern.

Wilkinson suggests that the inclusion of PEO successfully addresses the grey area between PKO and war, and, in doing so, meets the intent of developing the new doctrine. Yet in reading the British and American doctrine, there remains a grey area regarding how enforcement operations should be viewed. Only the Canadian doctrine makes a clear distinction between the shades of grey that differentiate a shift between a PEO that does not designate an enemy and one that does. It is the linkage to Chapter VII of the UN Charter that makes this distinction in US and British PEO doctrine problematic. While such ties to Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter appear to match the differences in consent and levels of force and, as such, seem to be a reasonable framework, it is noted that some Chapter VII operations, for example, Korea and the 1990 Gulf War, were considered wars, with an aggressor being defined and military victory sought. While none of the national doctrines would categorize these as PO, there remains a level of confusion and misunderstanding, largely due to the terminology.<sup>45</sup> Notwithstanding this potential for confusion, all but Canada continue to use the Chapter VI and VII constructs to frame the doctrinal concept and define PO under Chapter VII as enforcement operations. By building on the Michael Lund's "camel hump" model of

conflict<sup>46</sup> and by including the wider components of third party roles, it is POSSible, by examining the intent of the intervention force, to align the primary components of conflict resolution with the various stages of a conflict.<sup>47</sup> The intent and hence the makeup of the intervention force at specific points along the cycle of conflict is shown in figure 2.




Figure 2. Comparison of National Doctrines  
 Source: US Army, CGSC, A522, Peace Operations, Lesson 1( USA CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS). P 4..

In addition to the conceptual model, Figure 2 graphically presents the range of activities that are included within the three national doctrines for PO. In doing so, it is clear that Canadian and British doctrines, by being more inclusive, take a broader view of PO. The issue is not just a question of language differences; rather, it encompasses not

only how the three militaries see their role in PO, but also how they view conflict resolution as a whole.

While US doctrine acknowledges the full range of conflict resolution tools, the doctrinal focus remains on a very narrow band, one that is closer to war fighting. While such a focused view can have its advantages in training and preparing a military force for PKO and PEO, there is the danger that it will not adequately prepare commanders, staffs, and soldiers for the wider range of missions necessary to fully support national policy and goals. However, the inclusion of the wide range of conflict resolution activities within operational-level doctrine does not necessarily translate into the ability to execute the mission sets at the tactical level. Unless service doctrines incorporate this framework the result “on the ground” will not change. By adopting the construct that the military tasks are the same, with the appropriate application of the three fundamental factors throughout the range of activities, Canada and the UK avoided the need for a comprehensive rewrite of tactical doctrine.

Each national doctrine uses a different set of principles to build the conceptual framework for PO. US doctrine utilizes the MOOTW principles, while British doctrine maintains the principles of war and redefines a number of them to better suit PSO. Canada uses factors influencing success in PSO. A comparison of these principles used can be found at table 1. Though these principles are useful for academic and staff college purposes, the variations are such that they are of little real utility when comparing national approaches to PO. What is consistent across the doctrines is the use of consent, impartiality, and use of force as fundamental factors.

Table 1. Comparison of Principles for Peace Operations		
Canada	United States	Great Britain
Factors Influencing Success	Principles of MOOTW	Principles of War
Unity of Effort	Unity of Effort	Selection and Maintenance of the Aim
Long Term Commitment	Perseverance	Sustainability
Legitimacy	Legitimacy	Legitimacy
	Objective	
Rapid Deployment and Transition to Operational Effectiveness	Security	Security
Professional Conduct	Restraint	Morale
		Offensive Action and Surprise
		Concentration of Force
		Economy of Effort

### Fundamental Principles

All the national doctrines agree that impartiality, consent, and use of force are the fundamental principles that frame the concepts and guide military activities in PO. It is in the application of these principles during planning and execution of the PO that national doctrines differ. Since it is the application of these factors that shape the context of the mission, it is here that interoperability issues are most likely to arise; therefore, it is worth comparing them in some detail.

### Consent

As discussed earlier, in the aftermath of an interstate conflict, the degree of consent should be relatively clear-cut and agreed in a peace plan by the disputing states, especially at the strategic and operational levels, and, as such, a PKF is suitable for this type of environment. It is during or following an intrastate conflict that discerning consent becomes highly problematic. All the doctrines agree that if the level of consent is

uncertain and the potential for opposition exists, it would be prudent to deploy a force capable of enforcing compliance and developing consent from the outset. In doing so, all three doctrines acknowledge that there is likely to be a lack of consent present in PEO; however, notwithstanding the initial level of consent, all stress that the promotion of cooperation and consent is fundamental to achieving the political end state throughout the range of PO. All agree that without the active cooperation and consent of the parties and the indigenous population, there cannot be a self-sustaining peace. Thus the need to promote cooperation and consent and the long-term demands of peace may constrain and/or restrain military operations. The important task is to create a framework of consent at the strategic and operational levels that is “sufficiently robust to withstand the use of force at the tactical level.”<sup>48</sup> Therefore, consent is the decisive factor in determining whether a PO is PK or PE, and developing consent should be the main objective of the PKF.

### Impartiality

Impartiality is another key element of the doctrinal constructs. This is of particular importance when distinguishing between PE operations that fall under the umbrella of PO and enforcement actions that identify an enemy, after which actions are taken without consideration of impartiality. All three doctrines emphasize the fact that in a peacekeeping, vice enforcement, operation the PKF does not recognize a particular side as the aggressor or victim, stating that the conduct of a PKF should always be impartial and even-handed. If force is used against a particular party, it should only be because of what that party is doing or not doing in relation to the mandate, rather than because of who that party is. The perception of partiality and the consequent loss of consent could

lead to widespread noncompliance and escalation. The PKF could risk becoming a party to the conflict when it is not structured or resourced to conduct combat operations. There is agreement that even when force is applied in an impartial manner, it is unlikely to be perceived as such, especially by any party that persistently transgresses. By remaining impartial the PKF reinforces its legitimacy, and its actions can be used to counter claims of partiality.

British and Canadian doctrines are closer to consensus than that of the Americans. Although they acknowledge that there is difficulty in maintaining the total perception of impartiality once force is used, both doctrines stress the importance of impartiality and, as such, frame the operational concept around this vital factor.

Within the broader construct of conflict resolution, Canadian and British doctrines use impartiality to differentiate enforcement actions (PEO and CPKO) which fall within the PSO construct and that of the more warlike enforcement actions seen under the higher end Chapter VII missions. It is in this area that US doctrine differs. US doctrine recognizes the importance of impartiality in PO, but narrowly applies this principle to PKO, not PEO. In fact, US doctrine identifies the “central goal of PEO as achievement of the mandate, not maintenance of impartiality,”<sup>49</sup> stressing, “Impartiality is desirable but not necessary, may not be attainable, and is not central to achieving success in PEO.”<sup>50</sup> This divergence of such a fundamental principle could lead to what might seem to other allies to be inappropriate actions by US forces, a disconnect in a common approach, and lack of cohesion within the information plan. The danger is that to the US commanders and planners, the approach would seem appropriate but due to the difference in perspectives this approach could be seen as inappropriate to multinational partners. The

result could lead to a perception of fracturing within a multinational force or the divergence of goals and end states. In the extreme, US PKF could slide from PO into enforcement operations more quickly and in a less deliberate or planned manner than the UK or Canada, resulting in all or part of the original PKF becoming a party to the conflict. The point is that the overarching purpose of all such operations, and all three doctrines agree in this matter, should be not to participate in the conflict, but to act impartially to bring it to an end. While it is in agreement with the general idea, US doctrine does not specifically support this concept.

### Use of Force

All three national doctrines concur that when force is used it should be precise, appropriate, proportionate, and designed to resolve and defuse a crisis with a view to prevent further escalation.<sup>51</sup> Collateral damage should be minimized and reasonable measures taken to avoid civilian casualties. If possible and appropriate, options other than the use of force should be considered. The PE construct suggests that the use of force is appropriate where there is opposition or noncompliance with the agreement or mandate and the use of consent-promoting techniques to maintain consent have failed. In using force the doctrines emphasize the prudent use of force with the aim of reinforcement of the peace rather than a military victory. In doing so commanders are warned that they must balance the short-term advantages gained from the use of force with the requirements of the other elements involved in the longer term peace-building stage.<sup>52</sup>

In an attempt to operationalize this concept, Canada and the UK emphasize the minimum use of force, regardless of the situation. The conceptual model for the use of force is further restricted during PKO by emphasizing that force is to be used only for



self-defense. US doctrine handles use of force in a similar manner, but diverges in a number of areas. First of all, under the PKO construct, the US defines self-defense more broadly, to include defense of the mission, than Canada or the UK. Secondly, rather than viewing the application of force in the context of minimum use of force, US doctrine uses the term “appropriate levels” of force. On initial examination, the difference in how force should be used may appear minor. However, the expanded definition of self-defense provides US forces with a more aggressive view of PKO than that of the British or Canadian forces. This aggressive approach is amplified by the fact that the idea of minimum force has been replaced by appropriate force. When combined, US doctrine establishes a paradigm that allows more force to be used across a wider range of circumstances.

While Canadian and UK doctrine state that only the minimum force necessary should be used, the doctrine does not exclude the use of force sufficient to overwhelm, should it be necessary to do so. In fact, as British doctrine points out, in PE “overwhelming force may have to be deployed when challenged to create an immediate impact.”<sup>53</sup>

Table 2 provides a graphical comparison of the three national doctrines. As can be seen, there is a great deal of consistency among the three, and in cases of divergence a number are judged to have little or no effect on the operational level commander. Yet there are three areas, highlighted in grey, that are judged to have the potential to impact on interoperability.

Table 2. Comparison of Key Elements of National Doctrine

	<b>US PKO</b>	<b>UK PKO</b>	<b>CA TPKO</b>	<b>US PEO</b>	<b>UK PEO</b>	<b>CA CPKO</b>
<b>CONSENT OF PARTIES</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	1. Uncertain 2. Lacking 3. Not required	1. Uncertain 2. Lacking 3. Not required	1. Uncertain 2. Lacking 3. Not required
<b>IMPARTIALITY OF PKF</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Not essential	Yes	Yes
<b>USE OF FORCE</b>	1. Appropriate level of force 2. Self-defense 3. Defense of mission	Minimum force	Minimum force	1. Appropriate level of force 2. Potential use of overwhelming force	1. Minimum force 2. Potential use of overwhelming force	1. Minimum force 2. Potential use of overwhelming force
<b>AGREEMENT IN PLACE</b>	Yes	Yes	Yes	Preferred but not necessary	Preferred but not necessary	Yes
<b>UN CHAPTER VI</b>	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
<b>UN CHAPTER VII</b>	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No

In two areas, the use of force and impartiality, US doctrine diverges from that of Canada and the UK. Divergence in these two areas is likely to result in a US force taking a more aggressive posture in both PKO and PEO. Such an outlook can impact on ROE development, agreement and interpretation, structure, relationships with the factions, and conduct of operations. The third diverging factor is that the Canadian CPKO is seen as an operation that takes place with a low level of consent but still within the context of some type of agreement or mandate, while this is not necessary understood as such in US or UK doctrine. In real terms, this is a strategic issue; however, the lack of an agreement could have a negative impact on consent and legitimacy, both of which are required for a long-term solution, and add to doctrinal confusion on whether a particular mission is PO or enforcement.

In general terms, all the doctrines agree that the art of PO is generation, maintenance, and, if lost, the retrieval of consent; and the main concern of a PKF is to stay on the right side of the line of consent. Only by maintaining as much consent as possible can the force fulfill its humanitarian and mediation tasks and remain relatively secure. Operating without consent, a force that was originally designated or assembled as a PKF changes to become a PE force and is liable to enter a war-fighting situation in which its own security will become its overriding preoccupation, often at the expense of other critical mission elements and objectives.

By including PEO as an element of PO, the three new doctrines do not differ from traditional peacekeeping doctrine in scope alone. The new doctrine offers guidance on the application of the three key peacekeeping principles of consent, impartiality and use of force under a number of broad operating environments. The doctrine agrees that in the mainly intrastate conflict of today's operational environment, the consent of all parties is extremely difficult to achieve and maintain. Likewise, with judgments about impartiality being a matter of perception and vested interest of the different parties concerned, most actions are perceived at best as ambiguous and at worst as downright partisan in wars which are still “live.”<sup>54</sup> To some, the new doctrine has resulted in the erosion of the principle of minimum force and what Regehr has warned of as “the developing conventional wisdom that peacekeeping is evolving towards a much greater reliance on the use of force.”<sup>55</sup> Hugo Slim warns that an increased use of force raises the stakes and the risks in any PO.<sup>56</sup> This concern can be seen in the US doctrine, where force protection is almost an obsession.<sup>57</sup> Yet to have ignored that the new operational environment required a different paradigm, the inclusion of PEO-CPKO, would have

placed commanders and planners in the impossible situation of executing missions without the appropriate doctrine to guide and shape PO.

Another strong feature underlying the new doctrines is that they acknowledge, and in some cases formally accept, that operations are likely to be long-term. While the main military mission may be achieved rather quickly, overall it is recognized that peacekeeping forces can create space but not solutions. Therefore, inherent in the doctrines is an element of pragmatism which recognizes its limits and the extreme difficulties and uncertainty inherent to today's peacekeeping environment.<sup>58</sup>

US doctrine supports this view, in particular the acceptance of long-term commitment, as a principle of MOOTW; however, the application of the doctrine may be negatively influenced by Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD),<sup>59</sup> which insists on having a clear view of "end states" before beginning a PKO and having them clearly in writing as "sunset clauses." This apparent disconnect between doctrine and policy led Connaughton to argue that "American force characteristics are arguably unsuitable for peacekeeping operations, which tend to be drawn out, require inordinate patience and the ability to turn the other cheek."<sup>60</sup> The more aggressive tone of US PO doctrine, combined with PDD 25, would seem to support Cannoughton's assertion. While such a divergence between national doctrines could lead to a number of interoperability issues if the nations deployed forces with the same mandate under the same mission, it can also help in identifying the distinctive competencies of different national armies in order to fulfill the range of PK activities faced by the international community. Connaughton describes this important point by his phrase "forces for courses."<sup>61</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Chapter 1, Article 1 of the United Nations Charter, found at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>, accessed 31 May 2005.

<sup>2</sup> Ch <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/apter VII of the United Nations Charter>, found at <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>, accessed 31 May 2005.

<sup>3</sup> Under Article 27 the permanent members of the Security Council have the veto power. It provides that on all matters that are not procedural, decisions of the Security Council require concurring votes of the permanent members, except that in decisions under Chapter VI and under Article 52 parties to a dispute abstain from voting.

<sup>4</sup> The categorization of PO varies depending on the literature used. A RAND study, by Bruce Pirnie and William Simons, *Soldiers for Peace, an Operational Typology* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996), suggests five types of PO, but in explaining them groups them into three major categories – traditional peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and complex peacekeeping.

<sup>5</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, UN Document A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995, paragraphs 35-36.

<sup>6</sup> Pirnie, 3.

<sup>7</sup> British Army, Design for Military Operations, British Military Doctrine, 1996

<sup>8</sup> Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2002), 139.

<sup>9</sup> B-GL-300-001, Peace Support Operations, (Kingston: Chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, 2002), ii.

<sup>10</sup> JP 1-02, found at <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/03994.html>, accessed 13 May 2005.

<sup>11</sup> Based on Robert Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss*, (London: Praeger, 2004), 3.

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/p/03994.html>, accessed 31 May 2005.

<sup>13</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Peace Operations*, (Washington: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1999), I-6 9 (hereafter cited as JP 3-07).

<sup>14</sup> JP 3-07, II-1.

- <sup>15</sup>Ibid, I-7.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid, I-10.
- <sup>17</sup>Ibid, I-10.
- <sup>18</sup>Ibid, I-10.
- <sup>19</sup>Ibid, III-2
- <sup>20</sup>Ibid, III-3
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid, I-10
- <sup>22</sup>Ibid, I-7
- <sup>23</sup>Ibid, I-7.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid, I-11.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid, I-11.
- <sup>26</sup>Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, *Peace Support Operations* (Northwood Middlesex: United Kingdom Chief of Joint Operations, 2000), 1-1.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid, 1-4.
- <sup>28</sup>Ibid, 3-1.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid, 2-7.
- <sup>30</sup>Ibid, 2-5.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid, 3-3.
- <sup>32</sup>Ibid, 2-5.
- <sup>33</sup>Ibid, 3-4.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid, 3-5.
- <sup>35</sup>B-GL-300-001, i.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid, i.
- <sup>37</sup>Ibid, 2-1.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid, 2-3.

<sup>39</sup>Prior to Somalia UN missions had been primarily Chapter VI and as such fell under peacekeeping doctrine while a more 'robust' or coercive approach fell under combat operations. Such a doctrinal construct left a doctrinal and therefore a conceptual gap that was ill suited for the Post-Cold War environment.

<sup>40</sup>B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, 2-5.

<sup>41</sup>B-GL-300-001 2-8.

<sup>42</sup>JP 3-07, I-1

<sup>43</sup><http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No46/Towards.html>, Mark Malan (Institute for Security Studies)

<sup>44</sup>JP 3-07, II-1.

<sup>45</sup>This observation is based on teaching six PO courses (this is a 27-hour graduate-level) at the US Army Command and General Staff College, as well as discussions with faculty within the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations.

<sup>46</sup>Lund's model suggests that all conflicts have a natural cycle and that there are windows of opportunity at specific points along the cycle that are open for intervention. His theory argues that successful intervention is achievable up to the threshold of war after which intervention is generally unsuccessful until some significant incident occurs.

<sup>47</sup>These roles are adapted from a presentation used at the US Army Command and General Staff College for an elective course in PO.

<sup>48</sup>JWP 3-50, 21.

<sup>49</sup>JP 3-07, I-10.

<sup>50</sup>JP 3-07, III-2.

<sup>51</sup>B-GJ-005-307/FP-030, p. 2-8; and JWP 3-50, p 4-8. JP 3-07.3, p. III-9.

<sup>52</sup>Wilkinson, 9.

<sup>53</sup>JWP 3-50, 4-5.

<sup>54</sup>Hugo Slim, "Military Humanitarianism and the New Peacekeeping: an Agenda for Peace?" *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, available from <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a003.htm>; Internet; accessed 21 July 2003.

<sup>55</sup>Regehr, in Slim.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>JWP 3-50, ii.

<sup>59</sup> PDD 25 was signed by President Bill Clinton on 3 May 1994. The PDD sets forth US policy on reforming multilateral peace operations. The policy includes three rigorous standards of review for US support for or participation in PO. For details of the unclassified version see <http://www.fas.org/irp/ofdocs/pdd25.htm>.

<sup>60</sup> Connaughton, 1992, p40 in Slim.

<sup>61</sup> In Slim.



## CHAPTER 4

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### General Conclusions

The importance of identifying potential divergence in national doctrines cannot be overstated. All nations agree that PO are likely to continue and that by their nature PO forces will continue to be multinational in composition. When contributing nations' overarching doctrines differ, particularly in areas of impartiality and use of force, the result can be misunderstanding and inappropriate or undesired actions by a PO force, which can eventually lead to mission failure. Secondly, such an analysis can assist in the development of multinational doctrine, such as that being developed by NATO. In fact, NATO PSO AJP 3.4.1 is currently being reviewed for ratification. An understanding of the divergences within the national doctrines should be included in the review to ensure that they are reconciled within the Allied Joint Publication or, as a minimum, clearly articulated and understood as a planning factor.

In 1992 Cassidy stated, "There seems to be a veneer of consonance among the three doctrines in their principled and restrained approaches to using force, these doctrines also represent a rather divergent range of typologies. The Canadian and British approaches are at the opposite end of the spectrum from the American approach."<sup>1</sup> Examination has shown areas of convergence and divergence in the new operational-level doctrine of Canada, the US and UK for PO. While there are a large number of areas of convergence, the doctrines diverge in a number of significant areas that could cause interoperability issues. First is the doctrinal construct that each nation uses to frame PO. Both the US and UK doctrine link PKO and PEO to Chapters VI and VII of the UN

Charter, while Canada breaks from such convention and groups PO by typical tasks that are performed during the mission itself. The use of such differing typologies can result in commanders and planners “seeing” a similar operational problem differently. A different mental construct results in assigning different priorities to tasks and, in general, developing different solutions to solve a particular set of problems. Such a difference in paradigm is of interest to more than simply academics and staff college instructors, but needs to be considered when planning operations.

#### Discussion of Subordinate Research Questions

How do the operational-level military doctrines of the US, UK, and Canada define PO? All three nations agree that operational-level doctrine provides a conceptual framework or construct which guides thought and organizes how operations are planned, and in doing so provides the “what to do”, while tactical level doctrine provides the “how to do it”. In general terms, all three nations view doctrine as an authoritative expression of a military’s fundamental approach to conducting operations. However, the national doctrines define PO differently. US PO doctrine is more limited than that of British and Canadian, in that it is restricted to PKO and PEO. British and Canadian PO doctrines take a wider approach to PO to include peace making, peace building, and humanitarian operations. The reasons for this can be explained by the US doctrinal use of MOOTW as an overarching concept that includes PKO, PEO, and other elements that make up the evolving stability and reconstruction operations doctrine and concepts. Neither the UK nor Canada has such an overarching doctrine. The impact on interoperability between the three nations is that Canadian and British planners and commanders should have a

broad or more holistic approach to operations that better fit the contemporary operating environment than their US colleagues.

What major principles underpin the doctrine for conducting PO? While the three national doctrines differ on the listing of principles or tenets of PO, there is agreement on the importance of use of force, impartiality, and consent. The application of these three key principles is consistent when discussing PKO; however, when discussing PEO, US doctrine differs from that of Canada and the UK.

Canadian and British PEO doctrine consider impartiality as essential. US PEO doctrine recognizes the importance of impartiality but is specific in subordinating impartiality to enforcing the mandate. What is interesting is that both Canadian and British doctrine agree with US doctrine on the importance of enforcing the mandate, but they insist on the importance of impartiality in doing so. This divergence in application of impartiality has two potential interoperability issues. The first is that Canadian and British doctrines echo the majority of the literature on PO, which argues that impartiality is the single factor that distinguishes PEO from warfighting. This difference in how operations are distinguished is critical to understanding an agreement between nations on both the ends and ways used to resolve conflict. Additionally, the differing views on the importance of impartiality have a direct connection to how a nation views the use of force.

As outlined in the thesis, US doctrine differs again from both British and Canadian PEO doctrines. While on the surface the differences appear to be that of semantics, further study reveals that US doctrine allows for a wider use of deadly force to be employed more rapidly than that of the other two nations. This fact, combined with the

view on impartiality, results in US doctrine being more aggressive and robust in the use of force.

#### Answer for the Primary Research Question

What, if any, impact do any differences have on interoperability? Based on an examination of new operational doctrine, this thesis has shown that there remains a divergence in national approaches to PO. These differences are such that they have the possibility to impact on planning and execution of PO, particularly in the areas of impartiality and use of force.

Impartiality is considered a critical component of both Canadian and UK doctrines. This basic principle impacts on a range of operational issues that can include use of force (ROE) and attitudes towards and subsequent actions against one or more of the warring factions. The tangible result is the identification of a warring faction or coalition of factions as “the enemy,” making the US force more likely to become a party to the conflict, rather than an intervention force.

But perhaps the greatest divergence is in the articulation of the use of force. It is here that US doctrine diverges from that of the UK and Canada. Cassidy suggests that the US approach to use of force reflects American predilections for overwhelming and coercive force.<sup>2</sup> Such a difference in approach can be linked to the respective military histories. British experiences in Northern Ireland and later in PKO and the Canadian experiences in PKO result in an emphasis on winning the hearts and minds, as well as minimizing the use of force, while US military history, until recently, has been focused on fighting and winning large-scale conventional operations. Regardless of the cause, the end result is that US doctrine calls for greater use of force than does British or Canadian

doctrines. Such a diverging perspective on such a critical principle can result in US forces having a more aggressive approach to conducting PO than that of Canadian or British forces. Such a difference in approach can influence ROE, force protection measures, and focusing of lethal vice nonlethal targeting.

Nations develop doctrine based on a number of factors--capability, national culture, goals, and views on the use of the military to achieve national goals, and, as such, it is to be expected that national doctrines will differ. The critical issue in multinational operations is that doctrines must either agree or at the very least compatible, that is not mutually exclusive (in this case an unlikely development) or planners and commanders must be aware of the differences and account for them throughout the planning and execution stages of the mission. This has yet to occur.

### Recommendations

1. This thesis has taken a strictly academic approach to examining the various national PO doctrines. While it has identified a number of key areas that differ doctrinally, it is unclear if these differences would result in actual differences in an operational environment. That is, does the application of the differing doctrine actually result in different approaches to PO? In order to answer this question it is recommended that an examination of specific PO in which the three nations have participated be conducted in order to see if the differences in doctrine materialize into differences in application, particularly in the areas of ROE.

2. The differences in doctrine and the potential for interoperability issues should be reflected in documentation, such as the ABCA Coalition Handbook.

3. Evolving NATO doctrine for PO and stability operations should take into account the differences in national doctrines. While the ideal solution would be for NATO doctrine to influence, that is change, national doctrine, historically this has not occurred; therefore, NATO doctrine should include a section outlining differences.

4. Evolving stability and reconstruction doctrine should be cognizant of the potential differences in the doctrine of habitual coalition partners and the potential interoperability issues, with a view to eliminating the majority of the major conflicts.

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<sup>1</sup>Cassidy, 6.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid, 235.

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